I investigate how new communication technologies shape intra-party politics within ruling parties in authoritarian regimes. I argue that digital media empowers political elites to build mobilization capabilities, allowing them to circumvent traditional pathways for career advancement and rise within party hierarchies. This transformation introduces uncertainty into the political investments of elites, discouraging them from investing in the party. As a result, elite loyalty weakens, and internal party cohesion erodes. Using a mixed-methods approach and focusing on Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (the AKP), I find that online popularity becomes a critical factor in securing party nominations for elites. While elites with greater online influence are less likely to defect from the party, they are more likely to engage in independent political behavior. Further analysis reveals that digital media enhances elites' influence within the party by enabling them to signal their contributions to public and party services. At the same time, it amplifies their social influence by facilitating clientelism and generating bandwagon effects among citizens. Cross-country analysis suggests that similar dynamics can be observed in other authoritarian regimes with limited electoral competition. This paper provides new insights into the durability of authoritarian governance and its implications for political liberalization.

What political motivations underlie mosque construction in authoritarian regimes? To explore this question, I leverage a unique dataset that meticulously tracks the annual issuance of construction and occupancy permits for mosques in Turkey, including information on their funding sources. Using a regression discontinuity design, I present evidence that the central government strategically prioritizes mosque construction in electorally competitive opposition districts over competitive incumbent districts. This targeted pattern, however, is absent for mosques funded by municipalities or private entities. Crucially, mosque presence provides electoral advantages to President Erdoğan’s party by both persuading religious voters and reducing opposition turnout. These findings illuminate how sacred spaces, such as mosques, can be co-opted as instruments of propaganda to advance autocrats' political agendas.

Do the electoral calculations of autocrats in competitive authoritarian regimes shape the distribution of potentially contentious public goods, such as education? If so, how are such public goods targeted and do they lead to attitudinal changes in the autocrat's favor? We offer a set of hypotheses linking autocrats' political strategies to the distribution of educational resources and also theorize their impact. We test our theoretical predictions in the case of Turkey, analyzing how the Justice and Development Party (AKP) regime has distributed a particularly contentious form of religious public schooling--imam hatip middle schools--across competitive municipalities. Using a regression discontinuity design to account for endogeneity issues, we show that, among municipalities with a high degree of electoral competition, the AKP disproportionately distributes religious middle schools to opposition-controlled districts after the 2014 municipal elections. We also find suggestive evidence of changed norms and beliefs in these areas. Specifically, Turkish municipalities targeted with an increase in religious middle schools exhibit increased demand for subsequent religious education, greater youth identification with religious values and dress-codes, and diminished youth support for secular parties. The paper contributes to the literature on distributive and authoritarian politics by demonstrating that the provision of contentious public goods under competitive authoritarian regimes can follow a distinct "indoctrination" logic and that such a strategy can successfully shift societal norms in the autocrat's favor.

Technological advancements have dramatically improved quality of life, but their rapid development may also distort citizens' perceptions of government performance in authoritarian regimes. This paper introduces the concept of shock modernization, where individuals mistakenly attribute technological progress to effective governance - even when such advancements stem from global trends rather than state-led initiatives. Drawing on literature from authoritarian politics, retrospective voting, and competence misattribution, I test this theory through a priming experiment in Egypt. Participants in the treatment and control groups read identical texts describing how either artificial intelligence (treatment) or radio (control) transformed industries and information distribution. Experimental results reveal that respondents exposed to the AI version expressed stronger support for their government and lower protest intentions compared to those exposed to the radio version. A causal mediation analysis integrated in the experiment reveals this effect is driven by confusion around technological developments: when respondents receive information about how AI works, the observed effect disappears. Cross-country analysis demonstrates that shock modernization operates broadly across nearly all authoritarian regimes, with positive technology attitudes correlating with higher government trust even after controlling for political affiliation. The study proposes a novel mechanism through which autocrats sustain support, independent of traditional patronage or propaganda strategies.

Existing scholarship typically categorizes propaganda into distinct ideal types. Yet, regimes frequently blend these strategies within the same message, a tactic we term hybrid propaganda. However, the effects of this hybrid approach remain unclear.Using a survey experiment with real advertisements from Egypt’s campaign promoting its New Administrative Capital, we compare the impact of hybrid propaganda to hard propaganda—which seeks to demonstrate the regime’s crude power. Our analysis reveals that hybrid propaganda outperforms hard propaganda, significantly enhancing citizen satisfaction with government services and positively shaping individual economic outlooks. Simultaneously, hybrid propaganda suppresses willingness to dissent among younger respondents, thereby addressing regime fears regarding youth mobilization. Additionally, hybrid propaganda effectively distorts economic perceptions among less educated individuals while intensifying inequality perceptions among the highly educated. These findings illustrate the strategic advantages and inherent complexities of hybrid propaganda. This study presents that by integrating multiple messaging strategies, authoritarian regimes can simultaneously target distinct demographic segments, optimizing control over public opinion and behavior. 

A robust literature in political science examines the ways in which regimes regulate religious life to bolster support for the ruling government.  In the context of the Middle East, Islamist groups have traditionally used mosques to disseminate their messages and win followers. How have regimes responded to the regulation of religious life and mosque geographic placements in efforts to curb or strengthen Islamist support? In this paper we examine mosque geo-locations in Turkey and Egypt. Turkey’s Islamic AKP regime continues to win additional support by placing mosques in electorally competitive districts. While in Egypt, we show that although mosques are highly concentrated in areas dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, newer construction areas like New Cairo, reveal that government is controlling mosque placement to curb Islamist influence.